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It is well established that growth companies positively and disproportionately impact employment creation and 
economic growth (European Commission, 2016a; OECD, 2019a). At the same time, these companies are 
confronted with significant challenges, including access to finance (OECD, 2019b). Numerous initiatives have 
been taken by regional and national authorities and by the European Union to alleviate growth companies’ 
expected funding gaps. Despite these efforts, 61% of EU27 high-growth companies highlight that access to 
finance is still a growth barrier (EIBIS, 2019) and 9% of European high-growth companies even consider access to 
finance as their most pressing problem (SAFE, 2019). To date, an area that has not received much attention from 
governments and academics is the funding of growth companies’ intangible assets. While intangible assets are 
important for most growth companies (OECD, 2019b), it is argued that intangible asset-based funding is not 
readily available due to the low perceived market value and tradability of these assets (Döttling, Ladika, & Perotti, 
2018). Hence, the financing of intangibles might pose significant difficulties for growth companies. The goal of 
the present document is to present a method to assess whether European growth companies suffer from a 
debt financing gap for their investments in intangible assets. 
We specifically focus on debt financing, as the equity financing gap has already received a lot of attention from 
both scholars1 and policy-makers (European Commission, 2016a). However, only a small minority of growth 
oriented companies want or are able to attract equity financing: while approximately 187,000 high-growth 
enterprises were identified in the EU in 2017 (Flachenecker et al., 2020), only some 4,000 companies raised 
venture capital in the same year (Invest Europe, 2019). Equity funding may either be undesirable for 
entrepreneurs, due to issues of sharing control with new shareholders, or be unavailable due to extremely high 
return expectations of early stage equity investors like venture capital or business angel investors, driven by high 
levels of business risk and information asymmetries. 
The availability of sufficient and adequate financing for high-growth companies may be even more acute in 
today’s economic climate, where the current COVID-19 pandemic is causing significant liquidity and cash flow 
shocks in the financial system and in companies worldwide. Companies heavily suffer from lower consumer 
demand, high uncertainty and supply shocks from both supply chain disruptions and reduced labour forces 
(European Commission, 2020a). While governments were quick to respond, this crisis will without doubt have a 
detrimental economic impact. Growth companies might be most heavily impacted and might hence suffer 
disproportionally from funding gaps. All the above problems may cause further pressure on growing firms’ 
investments, especially those in intangibles, and jeopardise future economic development. 
                                                          
1 For example, Gualandri and Venturelli (2009) find an equity gap of €147,000 for innovative Italian SMEs, Harding 
and Cowling (2006) find an equity gap between £150,000 and £1.5 million for U.K. high growth potential 
entrepreneurial firms. The Commission has recently launched ESCALAR, a new investment approach, developed 
together with the European Investment Fund (EIF), that will support venture capital and growth financing for 
promising companies, enabling them to scale up in Europe and help reinforce Europe's economic and 




A minority of growth companies – more specifically high-growth companies and scale-ups – account for more 
than half of the growth in employment and output in high-income countries (Grover Goswami, Medvedev, & 
Olafsen, 2019). Research has therefore particularly focused on high-growth companies and scale-ups, which 
makes data on these companies more readily available. Accordingly, the present analysis also relies strongly on 
data from high-growth companies and scale-ups.  
This study starts with defining key concepts such as ‘growth companies’ and ‘intangible assets’. Then, we 
document existing evidence on how much growth companies invest in intangibles and how firms currently 
finance their investments, with a focus on debt financing. Next, we review policy interventions and elaborate on 
the theory and reasoning behind the financial constraints growth companies might experience. Further, we 
review how the current literature measures funding gaps. Finally, we develop and present a method for 
measuring possible debt funding gaps. 
2. Definitions 
2.1. What are growth companies? 
Without converging on an explicit, well-established definition, research and practice commonly consider growth 
companies as those that have stronger levels of growth than comparable peer companies. Growth is typically 
measured as growth in sales or turnover, employees, total assets or cash flows (Delmar, Davidsson, & Gartner, 
2003). For reasons of data availability, our analysis focusses on high-growth companies or scale-ups. The terms 
scale-up and high-growth company are frequently used interchangeably—as we also do in this study. The most 
widely used definition of scale-ups—by professionals, policy makers and academics—is the OECD-Eurostat 
definition: “all enterprises with average annualised growth greater than 20% per annum, over a three-year 
period. Growth can be measured by the number of employees or by turnover.” (Eurostat, 2007, p. 61). 
Figure 1 shows the proportion of European scale-ups in the overall population of companies of all sizes and in 
the population of European SMEs, respectively (using the OECD-Eurostat definition). Approximately 8% of 
companies are scale-ups when growth in employment is considered and some 10-13% when growth in turnover 
is considered. Taken together, between 17 and 18% of all SMEs can be considered scale-ups (i.e., they either 




Figure 1: Proportion of scale-up companies in Europe 
Source: Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE), 2019. Associated question: Over the past three years, how 
much did your enterprise grow on average per year? Only 'over 20% per year’ is considered. 
2.2. Intangible assets 
Defining and measuring intangible assets, also referred to as ‘intangible capital’, is challenging. Table 1 presents 
the definition of intangible capital introduced by Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005) and used by the OECD. 
Without being exhaustive, table 1 presents frequently used examples to measure a firm’s overall intangible 
capital (Hunter, Webster, & Wyatt, 2005; Pastor, Glova, Liptak, & Kovac, 2017). The main categories of intangible 
capital are computerized information, innovative property and economic competencies. This highlights that 
intangible capital is much more comprehensive than only formal intellectual property rights like patents, 
trademarks or copyrights. The intangible intensity of a company should be measured on a continuous scale2 
rather than crudely separating companies investing in intangibles from those that do not (see for example 
Andrews & De Serres, 2012; Hunter et al., 2005; Sun & Xiaolan, 2019). Some companies might invest in intangible 
assets, but only to a limited extent, while others might invest heavily in intangible assets.  
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Table 1: Intangible capital, examples and firm-level measurements 





• Investment in software, data, IT 
networks and website activities (EIBIS, 
2019) 
• Engagement in in-house software 
development (CIS, 2019) 
Software expenses  
Innovative property R&D; patents; 
copyrights; 
trademarks 
• Investment in R&D, including acquisition 
of IP (EIBIS, 2019) 
• Proportion of machinery and equipment 
(incl. ICT) that is state-of-the-art (EIBIS, 
2019) 
• Introduction of innovative products, 
innovation percentage of total turnover, 
engagement in R&D (CIS, 2019) 
• Possession, licencing out3 or licencing 
in4 of patents, copyrights or trademarks 
(Kaufmann Firm Survey, 2011). 
• Number of employees working in R&D 










• Investment in firm-specific human 
capital (CIS, 2019) 
Wage and salary costs 
of employee training 
 
3. Scale-ups’ investments in intangible assets  
The European Investment Bank’s Investment Survey (EIBIS) 2019 gives an indication of the relative importance 
of intangible investments in the overall investment activities of SMEs. Figure 2 (Panel A) compares E.U. countries 
with the U.S.A.. As much as 40% of SME investments, both in the E.U. and the U.S.A., are in intangible assets (the 
top four categories in Figure 2). Panel B zooms in on European scale-ups5 and compares the relative importance 
of their investments to those of more mature companies (companies older than ten years). Almost 75% of all 
scale-ups’ investments are in intangible assets (R&D, software, data IT networks and website activities), which 
is substantially more than mature companies whose investments are only for 40% comprised of intangible assets. 
Mature companies mainly invest in tangible assets (land, buildings, infrastructure, machinery and equipment). 
Surprisingly, only 9% of European SMEs protect their intangible capital by means of intellectual property rights 
(IPR), compared to 90% of large companies (EUIPO, 2015). These figures highlight that a focus on the financing 
of scale-ups’ intangible investments is warranted.  
 
                                                          
3 This is defined in the Kauffman Survey (2011) as “licensing patents, copyrights, or trademarks owned by the business to 
other parties under a licensing agreement”. 
4 This is defined in the Kauffman Survey (2011) as “acquiring the right to use intellectual property such as patents, copyrights, 
or trademarks created by someone outside the business through a licensing agreement”. 




Figure 2: Average share of investment in different asset types 
 
Source: European Investment Bank: EIBIS 2019. Associated question: “In the last financial year how much did your business 
invest in each of the following with the intention of maintaining or increasing your company’s future earnings?”. 
Mature companies are companies older than 10 years. 
 
4. The financing of scale-ups 
4.1. Financing mix 
Figure 3 indicates how European firms finance their investments in general (SAFE, 2019). It shows the proportion 
of firms that stated to find a specific financing type relevant, meaning they have used it in the past, or consider 
using it in the future. The financing policy of the EU28 average firm is compared to that of scale-up firms, 
innovators and non-innovators, as defined in the SAFE (2019) report. The most relevant sources of funding for 
all types of companies, each considered relevant by more than 40% of the firms, are the traditional bank-related 
funding (overdrafts and loans) and leasing. Innovators and scale-ups consider all of the listed financing options 
to be more relevant compared to the other type of firms, suggesting that they need to raise funding from a 
more varied array of sources. However, equity financing is only relevant for slightly more than 10% of the 
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Figure 3: European firms’ use of financing 
Source: Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE), 2019 
Related question: Are the following sources of financing relevant to your firm, that is, have you used them in the past or 
considered using them in the future? 
 
Figure 4 delves deeper into the use of different financing sources in high-growth companies. While VC investors 
target firms with high growth potential, only a small fraction of high-growth companies raise VC funding. Indeed, 
only 2.03% of high-growth firms (16.59% of all firms) in the SAFE survey raised external equity (i.e., VC, business 
angel) over the last 6 months. This evidence also corresponds with Flachenecker et al. (2020), who identify 
approximately 187,000 high-growth enterprises in the EU in 2017, while in the same year only some 4,000 
companies raised venture capital according to Invest Europe (2019). VCs require high rates of return which not 
all growth companies can provide (Cochrane, 2005).6 Moreover, not all growth companies are willing to raise VC 
funding as this implies both giving up control and a higher cost of equity (Catalini, Guzman, & Stern, 2019; Da 
Rin, Hellmann, & Puri, 2013). Overall, while external equity in general and venture capital in particular are 
undeniably important to stimulate the growth of firms with high potential, many high-growth companies do not 
raise (or do not want to raise) external equity. In contrast, the SAFE survey shows that 63.04% of high-growth 
firms raised debt over the last 6 months.  
                                                          
























Figure 4: High-growth firms’ use of financing 
 
Source: SAFE (2019).Debt financing consists of bank loans, credit lines, bank and credit cards overdrafts and debt securities. 
Related question: Have you obtained the following sources of financing in the past 6 months? 
Interestingly, while scale-ups (28%) applied slightly more often for bank loans than mature firms (24%), the 
proportion of scale-ups that eventually received the total amount of bank financing applied for is equal to that 
of mature companies (72%) (Figure 5, Panel A). However, high-growth firms pay higher than average interest 
rates on their credit lines and bank overdrafts. Moreover, 25% of all scale-ups report obstacles, compared with 
22% of the mature companies (22%). More specifically, scale-ups report insufficient collateral or guarantees 
and unavailability of bank loans more often as an obstacle to receiving bank financing (Panel B). 
Figure 5: Bank application outcomes and reasons for bank financing being irrelevant 
 
Source: SAFE (2019) 
Related question panel A: “Bank loan (excluding overdraft and credit lines) - If you applied and tried to negotiate for this 
type of financing over the past 6 months, what was the outcome?”; related question panel B: “You mentioned that bank 












































Scale-ups Mature firms EU28
Panel A: Bank application outcomes
Applied but was rejected
Received not the total amount
Refused because cost was too high
Received everything
Proportion of firms that applied (LHS)








Scale-ups Mature firms EU28
Panel B: Obstacles to bank loans
Insufficient collateral or guarantee Interest rates or price too high
Reduced control over the enterprise Too much paperwork is involved




4.2. A further focus on bank financing 
While figure 3 highlighted the proportion of firms that find a particular source of finance relevant, figure 6 shows 
how much of a particular funding type is used (EIBIS, 2019). Between 60% (European firms) to 76% (U.S. firms) 
of all investments are financed by internal means, including retained earnings and internal funds (Figure 6, Panel 
A). Figure 6, Panel B, zooms in on the importance of different external financing sources. This panel again 
highlights the importance of traditional bank loans, especially in Europe. Bank loans, leasing and other bank 
financing even account for more than 90% of all SME external financing in Europe. This evidence is in line with 
the pecking order theory, which states that companies will finance investments with the financing method least 
subject to information asymmetries (i.e., internal funds) first, followed by debt finance and only then external 
equity finance as a last resort (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Newly issued equity and founders, family and friends (FFF) 
are not important for the average SME, and even less so in Europe compared to the U.S.A..  
Figure 6: Financing sources for European and U.S. SMEs versus large firms 
 
Source: EIBIS 2019  
Related  question: “Approximately what proportion of your investment in the last financial year was financed by each of the 
following?” – we have excluded intra-group lending, as this is only a small proportion and not relevant to this report. 
 
The evidence above focuses on the importance of bank debt for all SMEs, including high growth and low growth 
companies. Evidence from Belgian high-growth firms provides a similar picture. More specifically, in their study 
on the financing events of the top 1% high-growth firms in Flanders and Brussels over the 1997-2004 period, 
Vanacker and Manigart (2010) show that financial debt is the most common financing route, accounting for 
almost 45% of the financing events in their sample. Internal finance is the second most frequently used way to 
finance growth: nearly 39% of the financing events are increases in retained earnings. Only 16% of the financing 
events relate to raising external equity financing. Overall, although external equity is undeniably an important 
source of finance for those scale-ups that do raise equity, almost 85% of the financing events relate to retained 
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Panel B: Sources of external financing
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While there is ample evidence of the importance of traditional financing sources for scale-ups (SAFE, 2019; 
Vanacker & Manigart, 2010), the limited academic literature on scale-up finance has focussed primarily on equity 
financing, arguing that debt is less important for these companies (Duruflé, Hellmann, & Wilson, 2017; Wilson, 
2011; Wilson, Wright, & Kacer, 2018). Some academics argue this is because scale-up companies’ investment 
projects are not well suited for debt financing due to their high risk profile and the intangible nature of their 
investments, limiting the importance of tangible assets which could serve as collateral (Berger & Udell, 1998; 
Gualandri & Venturelli, 2009; Hellmann et al., 2016).  More than the “average” firm, intangible-rich scale-ups are 
subject to information asymmetries, exacerbated by the scarcity of collateral assets, as highlighted in Figure 5. 
Intangible-rich companies are more likely to finance their new investments with external equity, rather than with 
debt or retained earnings (Vanacker & Manigart, 2010).  
In spite of general scholarly belief that intangible assets are poor collateral and in spite of scale-ups reporting a 
lack of tangible collateral as an obstacle to receiving bank loans, some academic studies nevertheless suggest 
that intangible assets may be linked with debt financing. For example, Loumioti (2012) showed that 21 percent 
of U.S.-originated syndicated secured loans7 were backed by intangibles as collateral and that these loans did not 
perform worse than other secured loans. Factors associated with a stronger use of intangibles as collateral are 
their redeployability and borrower reputation. Interestingly, intangible assets are also positively related to long-
term debt levels for Dutch SMEs in 2002-2005 (Degryse, de Goeij, & Kappert, 2012).8 In line with this evidence, 
the OECD emphasizes the need for policy to foster the use of intangible capital as collateral for innovative, fast-
growing SMEs in their debt financing needs (OECD, 2019b). The British Business Bank (2018) furthermore 
advocates for lower interest rates for intangible-rich firms since they have lower default rates than firms without 
intellectual property. 
4.3. Availability of venture debt financing 
A relatively recent phenomenon to finance young and/or scale-up firms is venture debt lending (De Rassenfosse 
& Fischer, 2016; OECD, 2020). Venture debt lenders rely on a scale-up’s patents as collateral, using warrants to 
overcome the agency problems associated with debt. Recently, bank divisions as well as larger assets managers 
and smaller funds founded by ex-industry professionals have started to focus on the venture debt market 
(Kraemer-Eis, Botsari, Gvetadze, Lang, & Torfs, 2019). Venture debt might be a desirable funding source for 
growth firms because it is non-dilutive, but prior venture capital funding serves as a certification towards venture 
debt lenders. 
Data on venture debt is hard to find, however, because of the recency of the phenomenon. As such, there is little 
systematic data collection yet on debt amounts, performance of loans or repayment ratios. Based upon Preqin 
data, figure 7 panel A indicates that some 20% of VC-backed companies in the U.S. received venture debt 
financing at some point in their funding history, compared to only 8.4% for U.K. companies and 5.4% for non-
                                                          
7 The OECD (2019b), however, shows that a substantial part of all U.S. patent-based loans are large transactions from large 
corporations flooded with current assets (such as accounts receivables). 
8 These authors, however, also caution that very few SMEs in their sample use intangible assets as collateral. Moreover, they 




U.K. European companies (Hellmann et al., 2016). The median venture debt contract amounted to $8M for U.S. 
VC-backed scale-ups, $5.2M for U.K. scale-ups and $5M for scale-ups in the rest of Europe. It is clear that 
European scale-ups have access to less venture debt than U.S. scale-ups.  Further, companies that received 
venture debt financing are able to raise larger equity rounds, which refutes the concern that venture debt would 
merely be a substitute for venture capital (Hellmann et al., 2016). Figure 7 (panel B) shows that this wide 
difference found between the U.S. and E.U. venture debt market is comparable with that in the venture capital 
markets. 
Figure 7: Comparison between venture debt and venture capital 
 
Source (panel A): Hellmann et al. (2016); source (panel B): Invest Europe, OECD. Panel B is based on data for 2018. 
Regulatory changes in capital requirements for banks could foster the growth of the European venture debt 
market. According to the current MiFID framework, venture debt is considered a high risk loan. Given the 
complementarities with traditional bank lending services, relaxing those requirements for venture debt could 
make banks more eager to support growth companies by providing them with venture debt financing (Duruflé 
et al., 2017). Nevertheless, it is important to note that venture debt in the U.S. is almost exclusively provided by 
specialized venture capital investors, not by banks. 
As not all companies are able or willing to raise equity financing, and are hence hampered in their growth (OECD, 
2019a), the OECD (2019b) argues that it is crucial for policy to specifically address the problem of collateralisation 
of intangibles. More research is therefore needed on how to address this potential financing gap for intangible-
rich growth companies (OECD, 2019b). Nevertheless, some public policy initiatives worldwide already focus on 
addressing intangible-based debt funding; these are presented in the next section. 
5. Public policy interventions in the venture debt market 
Provided there is a debt funding gap for (European) intangible-rich growth companies, government intervention 
might be a way to – indirectly – restore the credit market equilibrium by increasing growth companies’ access to 
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mitigate all financing constraints. Rather, different policy interventions are targeting different components of 
the funding gap, both at the supply and demand sides of debt funding. Supply-side policy intervention through 
credit guarantee schemes or direct government funding is commonly used and a high priority in most OECD 
countries (OECD, 2010). However, this is often not specifically targeted towards (high-)growth companies9 
(Grover Goswami et al., 2019). 
Policy responses sometimes explicitly focus on intellectual property rights (IPR), which legally protect the 
intangible capital of a company, especially those intangibles resulting from R&D, branding and artistic work 
(OECD, 2013, 2015). As IPRs are legally protected, they are tradeable, licensable and provide salvage value in 
case of default (Harhoff, 2011; OECD, 2015). Moreover, IPR can reveal valuable information on a company’s 
quality and potential as the associated quality signal is easily observable and expensive to obtain for low quality 
companies (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2002; Hoenen, Kolympiris, Schoenmakers, & Kalaitzandonakes, 2014), thereby 
reducing information asymmetries. IPRs may hence address insufficient collateral concerns.  
Table 2 gives an overview of the policy interventions specifically targeting growth and intangible-rich 
companies. Having emerged in recent years, these policy initiatives are mainly concentrated in Asia (European 
Commission, 2016b; OECD, 2019b).  
The most elaborate financing scheme to address intellectual property (IP) and intangible-based financing is found 
in China. The Chinese government apportions collateral value to IP rights and acts as a central registry thereof. 
It encourages commercial lenders to provide intangible-rich SMEs with debt funding based upon this collateral 
value. Dedicated IP funds have furthermore been established to specifically target IP-backed lending in key 
industries (e.g., mobile internet and biotechnology). In many cases these funds are established by private 
companies with support from the government which covers up to 100% of the net loss. In response to the 2008 
financial crisis, the Shanghai government launched a scheme focussing on short term lending for average loan 
amounts of RMB 3 million (equal to 316,000 in 2009 euros). By the end of 2013, RMB 1.8 billion had been 
provided (equal to 220 million in 2013 euros) through this scheme. While only patents were originally considered 
as collateral, trademarks, and to a lesser extent copyright assets, have also been considered since 2016 (OECD, 
2019b). Other prominent countries providing state-backed collateralisation of intangible assets are Korea 
(backing up to 95% of the IP value) and Singapore (backing up to 50% of the IP value). Malaysia backs up to 50% 
of the loans provided by the government’s IP Financing Scheme (APEC, 2018). 
A second intervention, mostly used in Japan and Korea provides subsidised IP evaluation reports to business 
lenders (APEC, 2017). These reports are provided by independent researchers and are primarily based on public 
data as well as information provided by the SME (JPO, 2017). The Japanese scheme specifically targets SMEs and 
subsidises up to 150 evaluation reports per bank annually. The Japanese government also provides IP education 
– and hence familiarisation – to local business lenders. Early indications point to more in-bank incorporation of 
similar IP valuation techniques (OECD, 2019b). 
                                                          




A third policy initiative is to directly provide government loans to businesses willing to purchase or commercialise 
IP, or with IP as collateral. The Development Bank of Korea is a prominent user of this system and targets 
between-firm IP transactions to boost technology exchanges (IPO, 2018). Schemes in France also support 
intangible-rich companies through uncollateralised loans and guarantees between €50,000 and €3 million 
(Business France, 2017).  
Finally, the OECD further states that governments have acknowledged the funding gap, especially the one for 
intangible-rich scale-up companies, but urges governments to further adequately tailor policies to tackle any 
remaining hurdles (OECD, 2019b). The European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) further highlights 
that most SMEs with registered IPRs never tried to leverage their intangible assets (EUIPO, 2019). Therefore, 
policy should also be tailored to sufficiently inform growth companies of their options. 
Table 2: Public policy interventions  
 Prominent users Type of IP Guaranteed proportion 
Apportion of collateral value for IP and 








Up to 100% of value of IP 
95% of value of IP 
50% of value of IP 
50% of IP loan value  
Government subsidized IP evaluation 





Provision of loans for purchasing, 




Patents Info unavailable 
80% of value of IP 
Max €3 million 
6. Is there a debt funding gap? 
6.1. Mechanisms behind a possible debt funding gap 
A debt funding gap for growth companies occurs when high-quality demand does not meet supply for credit. In 
line with the definition of the equity gap provided by Wilson et al. (2018), a debt funding gap can be defined as 
the amount of debt that would have been provided under perfect information minus the actual amount of debt 
provided. A debt funding gap is hence primarily driven by information asymmetries. The value and risk of a 
project for which the entrepreneur seeks bank financing is only (partially) known to insiders of the firm. The bank 
often does not have sufficient information to correctly assess the value and risk of the project. Asymmetry of 








Adverse selection occurs when banks cannot set apart bad projects from 
good projects. In the case of symmetric information, banks would simply 
charge higher interest rates to riskier projects. Unfortunately, information 
asymmetries and the ensuing “lemons problem” prevent this. Banks are 
reluctant to charge higher interest rates to all firms, since the healthier 
projects would drop out of the credit market and the riskier projects 
would hence be overrepresented leading to the problem of adverse 
selection. Banks therefore prefer to adjust the supply of credit downwards 
by not letting firms lend beyond a certain interest rate (Jaffee & Russell, 
1976; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). This is summarized in figure 8. The credit 
market has an equilibrium for r = r”, where supply meets demand. 
However, banks decrease the credit supply by not allowing risky firms to 
lend beyond a certain interest rate. This results in an excess demand, since demand is lower in the new 
equilibrium. This supply adjustment further results in an increased interest rate r*. This however leads to less 
profits for the banks, as r* is not profit-maximizing, as highlighted in the second graph in figure 8. 
A second problem driven by information asymmetries is the moral hazard problem, which occurs when 
entrepreneurs take on excessive risk, misuse the funds or when their commitment to the project decreases once 
the credit has been approved because of the induced limited liability in case of default (Holmstrom, 1979). 
Information asymmetries lead to a funding gap because despite requesting credit and being able to afford it, 
banks are reluctant to provide debt financing to entrepreneurs. The moral hazard problem is somewhat 
mitigated by credit providers through monitoring by using covenants and demanding collateral (Rajan & Winton, 
1995).  
The debt funding gap is even larger for intangible-rich growth companies because information asymmetries are 
larger for those firms (Freel, 2007; Lee, Sameen, & Cowling, 2015; Schneider & Veugelers, 2010). Figure 9 
provides an overview of information asymmetries for intangible-rich growth firms. Firstly, intangible assets are 
of lower value for lenders since they are less redeployable and have uncertain liquidation values (in case of 
default) (Gilson, John, & Lang, 1990; Myers, 1977; Williamson, 1988). However, Dutch and U.S. findings suggest 
that banks do provide IP-based debt financing to some extent (Degryse et al., 2012; Loumioti, 2012; OECD, 
2019b). Secondly, high-growth companies are inherently riskier as they are commonly young companies. A firm’s 
age is negatively related to information asymmetry because young companies cannot provide lenders with a 
track record of successful lending history (Hall, 2010). 




Figure 9: Information asymmetries in intangible-rich growth companies 
 
6.2. Measuring the debt funding gap and identifying growth companies 
In measuring a funding gap, a researcher will try to determine whether a group of firms has more and easier 
access to (external) capital markets than other firms. A debt funding gap may manifest itself through high quality 
firms getting more expensive credit, not receiving the full amount requested, being rejected and/or 
discouragement (EIBIS, 2019; Ferrando & Mulier, 2017; Jappelli, 1990). If that is the case, firms are financially 
constrained. 
The classification of measures for financial constraints in table 3 below is predominantly based on Silva and 
Carreira (2012) and Gualandri and Venturelli (2009). While older literature mainly relied on indirect measures 
that link firm characteristics to financial constraints, more recent studies focussed on direct measures by 
surveying relevant stakeholders. Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages, as is briefly discussed in 
table 3. Because the growth company literature is not abundant, literature on their financial constraints is even 
less so. Nevertheless, for each method, relevant studies are presented in footnotes. 
Indirect (quantitative) measures include Q equations, investment to cash flow sensitivity analyses and Euler 
equations. The first measure argues that q (which measures the company’s investment opportunities) should be 
the only predictor for investment activities for unconstrained firms. This method is however not applicable in the 
context of (mainly) unquoted growth firms, since the calculation of q requires a firm’s market value. Furthermore, 
q has been shown to have low explanatory power, even for allegedly constrained firms. Investment to cash flow 
sensitivity analyses estimate the sensitivity of firms’ investment activities to their internally generated cash flows. 
If cash flow is strongly correlated with investments, then firms’ investment activities depend on the level of cash 
flow, suggesting that these firms are financially constrained. The cost of internal and external funds are different, 
otherwise these companies would simply request debt funding when investment opportunities arise. Finally, 




Young firms don't have a 
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The advantages of these measures is that they rely on objective and reliable data. A drawback is that the 
econometric models rely on strong assumptions which do not always hold in reality. Moreover, while these 
measures have been used in the past, empirically they cannot decisively separate a debt funding gap from an 
overall funding gap. They further rely on a – heavily debated – a priori classification of constrained versus 
unconstrained firms. Omitted variable bias further hampers the robustness of their results. Overall, indirect 
measures would not be recommended to be used for measuring whether intangible-rich growth companies’ debt 
are experiencing a debt funding gap. 
Direct measures directly ask firms whether or not they are financially constrained. They can therefore specifically 
target a debt funding gap. A first measure relies on textual analyses of companies’ annual reports. This would 
not be the measure of choice for growth companies since only few publish (detailed) annual reports. A second, 
more recent, direct measure relies on survey data. Advantages of surveys are that (i) it also captures discouraged 
borrowers and (ii) both the demand side and the supply side of debt funding can be questioned. Disadvantages 
is that the data are all self-reported, increasing the potential for biases, and that they present perceptions, which 
do not always match reality. 
Combined measures combine firm characteristics from large-scale datasets with survey data. Firms are asked 
whether or not they face financial constraints in a survey, which is afterwards linked to their accounting data. 
Given that both indirect and direct measures have their advantages and disadvantages, combined measures may 
represent “the best of both worlds”. Studying the debt funding gap through combined measures would therefore 
be our recommend approach. 
In theory, a pure experimental design might be considered, but it would be challenging to implement this in a 
valid way in the context of growth companies. However, natural and quasi-experimental designs, where an 
exogenous financing shock has been induced, have been used in prior literature. An example of such a possible 
financing shock is a change in policy, for example a legal change in the loan application costs which lowers the 
discouragement probability (Ferrando & Mulier, 2017), or the current coronavirus crisis. Due to the coronavirus 
outbreak, firms are currently operating under extraordinary circumstances. Arguably, this also leads to an 
exogenous financing shock highly suitable for quasi-experimental designs. It can, for example, be expected that 
growth companies will have more difficulties to finance their investment in intangible investments due to a lack 
of internal cash flows and a lack of debt resulting from a liquidity shock in the financial system. As such, the high 
levels of information asymmetries associated with intangible investments may make it even more difficult to 
finance them, compared to financing tangible assets or working capital.  
It is clear that measuring (debt) funding gaps is not easy. For one, not all firms experience financial constraints 
equally. There is firm-specific heterogeneity that cannot correctly be accounted for when only relying on indirect 
measures that associate firm characteristics to financial constraints. Secondly, financial constraints are time-
varying as a firm can move from one state to another – and even come back – over time (Cleary, 1999; Hubbard, 




unconstrained groups (Musso & Schiavo, 2008). There are degrees to this concept that most studies cannot 
capture. 
Next to measurement issues, another challenge is to identify the relevant firms. Identifying growth companies 
with varying intangible capital levels is difficult when relying on indirect measures. Few growth companies are 
publicly listed and not all intangible assets are correctly represented in large scale databases such as those with 
accounting information. For example, high-quality data on R&D or firm-specific human capital is often 
unavailable, or not available for all firms of interest, in large-scale databases. Some studies identify intangible-
rich (growth) companies through industry classifications (see for example Wilson et al., 2018). For European 
firms, this method relies on the Eurostat indicator of high-tech and knowledge-intensive industries. A summary 
of this classification is provided in annex 1. However, such approach is by definition crude and ignores the 
possibility that firms may differ significantly within industries. Some intangible-rich growth companies may 
operate in industries with low knowledge intensity (e.g., agriculture), while some growth companies in high 
knowledge-intensive industries may have few intangibles. 
Combining survey and indirect measures is therefore more suitable. To do so, it is recommended to combine 
data from large-scale databases (e.g., Orbis, PATSTAT, EUIPO registers) and survey evidence. Some information 
on intangible capital and firm characteristics can be captured through accounting data or patent data. Additional 
information can be captured through survey data. While database information allows to assess a situation (e.g., 
the proportion of debt financing in the financing structure of a firm), survey information is more useful to 
understand the “why” of a situation (e.g., was a firm unable to attract debt financing? What factors affected this 
inability? Or was a firm unwilling to attract debt financing?). This combined approach allows to build a more 
comprehensive dataset containing information from different sources, as such mitigating potential common 
method bias issues (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). Survey data also allows for verification of 
database information and vice versa.  A combined approach would enable a two-stop analysis, with a general 
analysis on growth companies in Europe using databases in a first step, complemented by an in depth analysis 
combining database and survey data for the survey respondents in a second step. Furthermore, the combined 
approach would allow to detect diversity in the data, such as differences between countries, industries, types of 
company and types of innovator (radical versus incremental, process versus product innovators). Finally, while 
this paper focussed on the debt funding gap, the proposed methodology would also allow to incorporate the 
existence and impact of an equity gap, and if and how this equity gap affects the debt funding gap.  





Table 3: Measuring methods for funding gaps 
 Methodology Advantages Disadvantages 
Indirect measures 
Q theory of investment10 Q (which summarizes a firm’s investment opportunities) 
should be the only predictor for investment. For 
constrained firms, it is not. Cash flow variables will have 
higher prediction power.  
• Easy to compute 
 
• Requires stock data. Few scale-ups are publicly listed 
• Reliability of 𝑞 
• Not firm specific 
Investment to cash flow 
sensitivities11 
 
Financial constrained firms are sensitive to cash flow in 
their investment decisions, unconstrained firms are not. 
• Easy to compute 
 
• Large debate on a priori classification of constrained 
firms in the models 
• Relies on 𝑞 to control for investment opportunities 
• Firms can move between being constrained and 
unconstrained based on the a priori classification12 
• Not firm specific 
Euler equations13 
 
For unconstrained firms, the cost of investing today 
equals future’s marginal cost of postponing investment. 
The equations’ parameter restrictions are met if a firm is 
not financially constrained. 
• Data availability 
• Does not rely on 𝑞 
 
• Large debate on a priori classification of constrained 
firms in the models 
• Not firm specific 




Does the firm state in its annual reports that it is 
financially constrained? 
• Firm specific 
• Rich information 
 
• Few growth companies have annual reports 
• Few companies report equally detailed 
 
                                                          
10 Examples include Blundell, Bond, Devereux, and Schiantarelli (1992); Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988); Poterba and Summers (1983). 
11 Examples include Almeida and Campello (2001); Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen (1998); Chapman, Junor, and Stegman (1996). 
12 E.g., If firm size is the a priori classification of financial constraints, this would mean that a firm becomes unconstrained simply because it grows beyond a certain threshold.  
13 Examples include Bond and Meghir (1994); Whited (1992) 




Table 3: Measuring methods for funding gaps – continued 
 Methodology Advantages Disadvantages 
Survey data15 
 
Ask firms directly whether or not they are financially 
constrained. 
• Firm specific 
• Rich information 




• Availability of data 
• Actual constraints do not always match perceived 
constraints 
• Self-reporting bias 
 Ask banks to what extent credit was denied and why. • Rare supply-side 
information and 
effects 
• Seldon used: difficult to obtain data from bank/ 
financial institutions (exception: ECB Bank Lending 
Survey). 
• Difficult to match with firm-specific behaviour since 
loan applications are confidential. 




Linking survey data to balance sheet data. • Firm specific 
• Rich information 
 
• Availability of data 
Experimental measures    
Experiments Using experimental methods to determine financial 
constraints based on firm characteristics. 
• Firm specific 




• Strictly randomized experiments are unavailable to 
date. Natural and quasi-experiments however are 
common17. 
• Only a very limited amount of variables can be 
adjusted across firms as part of the experiment. 
• Not generalizable. 
                                                          
15 Examples include Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Maksimovic (2006); Brown, Ongena, Popov, and Yeşin (2011); Savignac (2008). 
16 Examples for the U.S. include Hadlock and Pierce (2010); Lamont, Polk, and Saaá-Requejo (2001); Whited and Wu (2006). An E.U. example is Ferrando, Pal, and Durante (2019). 





Growth companies – including scale-ups – are vital for economic growth and employment. These companies, 
however, report significant difficulties in obtaining external funding to finance their growth. Because almost 75% 
of their investments are made in intangible assets, these companies generally lack sufficient tangible collateral 
(EIBIS, 2019). This situation is worrisome because scale-ups report that bank financing is their most relevant 
financing source (SAFE, 2019). Next to paying higher interest rates on credit lines and overdrafts, insufficient 
collateral or guarantees can further obstruct their access to bank financing. Due to the scarcity of what are 
commonly considered to be more collateralizable tangible assets, intangible-rich growth companies are likely 
subject to higher information asymmetries, making banks particularly reluctant to provide them with debt 
financing. New financing sources such as venture debt and policy interventions targeting intangible-rich 
companies have emerged to address this potential financing gap. 
This report developed a methodology to assess whether European growth companies whose main assets are 
intangibles suffer from a financing gap.  
1) We have argued that given the complex nature of what intangible assets are, a combination of data 
sources, including accounting data, patent data and survey data, will be required to adequately measure 
this concept. 
2) To measure potential financing constraints, various methods are identified and assessed. Indirect 
measures such as q equations, investment to cash flow sensitivity analyses and Euler equations rely on 
firm characteristics, accounting and market data to assess whether or not firms are financially 
constrained. This methodology is, however, not appropriate because it requires information that is only 
available for a limited number of growth companies (e.g., market data is only available for publicly-held 
firms) and because potential debt financing gaps cannot be isolated or distinguished from equity funding 
gaps. Direct measures rely on a firm’s own assessment of constraints via annual reports or surveys and 
are hence capable of specifically targeting a potential debt funding gap. Survey data can additionally 
capture discouragement in the lending process. Combined measures include both survey data and 
objective data like accounting and patent data and are therefore able to combine the “best of both 
worlds”—that is, they provide direct and indirect insights on a possible debt financing gap.  
Overall, a combination of survey data and large-scale databases (including accounting information and 
patent data, such as Orbis Europe) is the recommend method to (i) identify growth companies, (ii) 
measure their intangible assets and (iii) investigate whether they experience a debt funding gap. Such an 
approach was also taken by Ferrando et al. (2019) who rely on the EIB’s Investment Survey and link this with 
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Two-digit NACE code 
High-technology 21 
26 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations; 





27 to 30 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products; 
Manufacture of electrical equipment; Manufacture of machinery 
and equipment n.e.c. ; Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers 










Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products; 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products; Manufacture of 
other non-metallic mineral products; Manufacture of basic 
metals; Manufacture of fabricated metals products, excepts 
machinery and equipment; 
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 




31 to 32 
Manufacture of food products, beverages, tobacco products, 
textile, wearing apparel, leather and related products, wood and 
of products of wood, paper and paper products, printing and 
reproduction of recorded media; 
Manufacture of furniture; Other manufacturing 
 
  
                                                          






NACE Rev. 2 codes (2-digit level) 
Knowledge-intensive 
services (KIS) 
50 to 51 





64 to 66 







84 to 93 
Water transport; Air transport; 
Publishing activities; Motion picture, video and television programme 
production, sound recording and music publish activities; 
Programming and broadcasting activities; Telecommunications; 
computer programming, consultancy and related activities; 
information service activities (section J); 
Financial and insurance activities (section K); 
Legal and accounting activities; Activities of head offices, management 
consultancy activities; Architectural and engineering activities, 
technical testing and analysis; Scientific research and 
development; Advertising and market research; Other professional, 
scientific and technical activities; Veterinary activities (section M); 
Employment activities; 
Security and investigation activities; 
Public administration and defence, compulsory social security (section 
O); Education (section P), Human health and social work activities 






50 to 51 








Water transport; Air transport; 
Legal and accounting activities; Activities of head offices, management 
consultancy activities; Architectural and engineering activities, 
technical testing and analysis; 
Advertising and market research; Other professional, scientific and 
technical activities; 
Employment activities; 










Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound 
recording and music publish activities; Programming and broadcasting 
activities; Telecommunications; computer programming, consultancy 
and related activities; Information service activities; 
Scientific research and development; 
Knowledge-intensive 
financial services 









Public administration and defence, compulsory social security (section 
O); Education (section 
P), Human health and social work activities (section Q); Arts, 







Annex 2: Relevant European surveys 
 
Table A discusses how several relevant European surveys included a classification question based on the growth 
of the participating firms. As such, high-growth firms could be identified. As stated before, research – and surveys 
– specifically on growth companies are almost non-existent, we therefore only report on high-growth surveys. 
A first survey is the annual EIB Investment Survey (EIBIS), which surveys around 12,500 businesses through 
telephone interviews. Every three years a Start-up and Scale-up module is added. Results for the most recent 
Start-up and Scale-up survey are included in the 2019 EIBIS report and have frequently been referred to in this 
document. Important findings are that compared to their U.S. counterparts, European scale-ups report the 
limited availability of finance more often as a barrier to growth and that this is especially true for SMEs rather 
than for larger firms. More specifically, 61% of EU27 scale-ups see the availability of external finance as an 
obstacle to growth, compared to 51% of U.S. scale-ups. Policy recommendations focus on the development of 
the European venture capital and debt market to foster the availability of finance for these companies.  
The  second survey is the Survey on the Access to Finance for Enterprises (SAFE), conducted twice a year since 
2008. Contrarily to the EIBIS, this survey asks all companies whether or not they are a scale-up. They are able to 
identify 17% of all companies as scale-ups and show that 9% of these companies indicate access to finance being 
their most pressing problem, notwithstanding having experienced improved interest rates over the past six 
months.  
The third survey by Collewaert, Manigart, and Standaert (2019) identifies 80,451 scale-ups based on Orbis 
Europe, Zephyr and Crunchbase. The selection criteria are based on both the OECD definition and a second 
definition identifying scale-ups as companies having raised at least 1 million USD in funding since foundation. 
Additionally they survey 124 scale-ups. Results from this survey suggests that 38% of scale-ups remain fully 
internally funded, scale-ups that seek external finance most often seek bank financing. For those scale-ups that 
already raised external finance, additional funding and market access remain their largest challenges to growth.  
Other relevant surveys include the Eurostat’s Access to Finance survey (2011), the ScaleUp Institute’s Annual 
Scale-up review (2019) and the ECB’s Bank Lending Survey (2020). The first survey was conducted in 2010 and 
asked 25,000 SMEs about their access to finance during the global financial crisis. While success rates in obtaining 
financing severely decreased for all firms, high-growth firms sought more access to finance, especially bank loans. 
The ScaleUp Institute surveyed 509 scale-ups for her Annual Scale-up review and confirmed that access to finance 
is a key barrier for these companies. Lastly, the ECB surveys bank representatives on a quarterly basis. While the 





Table A: European surveys on the access to finance 
 Sample description Target selection methodology History and future intentions Latest relevant findings 
EIBIS: Start-up and Scale-up 
Survey Add-on (2019b) 
12,500 businesses19, incl. 1,100 
start-ups and scale-ups (EU: 499; 
U.K.: 120; U.S.: 482). 
Conducted through telephone 
interviews. 
 
• All businesses: via ORBIS20 
• Start-up and scale-up via 
Crunchbase21  
• Founded between 
2008 and 2018 
• Still active 
 
 
• Conducted every year since 
2016.  
• Start-up and scale-up survey 
is one of three add-on 
modules that vary every 
year. 
EU scale-ups report the limited 
availability of finance more often 
(61%) as a barrier to growth than 
U.S. scale-ups (51%), but rely less 
on debt financing. 
SMEs report twice as much being 
financially constrained than large 
firms. 
The report suggests that policy 
should address the under-
developed venture capital and 
debt market. 
ECB and EC: Survey on the 
access to finance for 
enterprises (2019) 
18,159 interviews, incl. high-
growth companies (17%) and 
gazelles22 (1%) 
Conducted through telephone 
interviews. 
• Random stratified sample 
from Dun & Bradstreet 
business register (country, 
size, industry). 
 
• Half-yearly study since 2008 9% of high-growth companies see 
finance as their most pressing 
problem. 
High-growth companies and 
gazelles more often experienced a 
decrease in the interest rates than 
the EU28 average over the past six 
months. 
                                                          
19 The survey has a minimum required sample size of around 12,300 firms, but is able to interview more than the required amount in nearly all countries. 
20 Firms were selection based on country, industry and employment. Only enterprises from the 28 EU Member States, with at least 5 employees and belonging to one of NACE categories C to J 
were selected (see methodology at https://www.eib.org/en/about/economic-research/surveys-data/about-eibis.htm). The final telephone sample was selected by random stratified sampling 
by country, industry, size and region 
21 The EIB argues that the Crunchbase Database accounts for nearly the whole population of young firms with high growth ambitions (EIB, 2019a). It reported 250,000 firms founded between 
2008 and 2018 that are still active. For a review of the database for economic and managerial research, see Dalle, Den Besten, and Menon (2017). 




Table A: European surveys on the access to finance – continued 
 Sample description Target selection methodology History and future intentions Latest relevant findings 
Vlerick Business School: 
Scale-Up Report (2019) 
80,451 scale-ups, incl. 124 
surveyed. 
• Eight European countries 
• All relevant23 firms from 
Orbis Europe, Zephyr and 
Crunchbase 
• Founded between 2007 and 
2013 
 
• One-off survey 38% of surveyed scale-ups remain 
fully internally funded, bank debt 
is the most frequently used 
external financing method. 
Funding is the biggest challenge to 
growth for the surveyed scale-ups 
that already raised external 
equity. 
Eurostat: Access to finance 
(2011) 
25,000 SMEs, incl. high-growth 
companies and gazelles 
(respective numbers not 
available) 
 
• Non-financial companies 
• Independent 
• 10+ employees in 2005 
• Still active in 2008 
• However not clear how 
sample was obtained. 
 
• Survey conducted 2010. 
• Will not be repeated. 
Focussing on the financial crisis, 
high-growth firms and gazelles are 
more likely to seek funding than 
other types of firms. This was 
primarily bank loan financing. 
ScaleUp Institute: Annual 
Scale-up review (2019) 
26,510 U.K. scale-ups, incl. 509 
interviews 
• ONS data, not clear 
however how interview 
sample was constructed. 
 
• Yearly report since 2014 Access to finance is a key 
challenge. The study did not 
address debt funding gap. 
ECB: Bank Lending Survey 
(2020) 
Representatives from 150 
banks 
• 150 eurozone banks 
 
• Four times a year since 2003. Credit standards for SMEs 
tightened while those of large 
companies remained unchanged. 
Not specifically targeted towards 
scale-up companies. 
 
                                                          





Annex 3: Structure for a survey on a debt financing gap in intangible-rich growth companies 
 
This annex proposes a topics for a survey for measuring a debt financing gap for intangible-rich growth companies 
in Europe.  
Part I: Firm-level information  
1. Industry 
2. Demographic information (e.g., location, age, size, stage of development) 
3. Level of innovativeness and type of innovations (e.g., process versus product innovations, radical 
versus incremental innovations) 
Part II: Financing (gap)  
4. Sources of financing 
5. Barriers to obtain financing (e.g., cost, collateral, lack of knowledge of IP and IP valuation with debt 
providers) 
6. Cost of financing 
7. Financing gap consequences (e.g., growth, investments) 
Part III: Intangibles  
8. Types of intangibles 
9. Level of investment in intangibles 
10. Reasons for (lack of) IP protection 
11. Impact of IP protection (e.g., growth, access to finance) 
12. Valuation of IP 
 
